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TAX LITIGATION
Must the Reports of
Tax Court Special
Trial Judges Be Disclosed?
by Leandra Lederman
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 131-135. © 2}04 American Bar Association.
Leandra Lederman is a professor of
law at George Mason University
School of Law and is the Visiting
William W. Oliver Professor of Tax
Law at Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington. She filed a
brief as amica curiae in support
of the taxpayers in these cases.
She can be reached at
llederma@indiana.edu or
(812) 855-6149.
Editor's Note: PREVIEWs deadline
precluded discussion of arguments
made in petitioners' reply briefs.
ISSUES
Is disclosure of a Special Trial
Judge's report in a case heard under
Tax Court Rule 183 required by the
Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, the right to effective
Article III appellate review, or feder-
al statutes?
Does Tax Court Rule 183 require
Tax Court judges to uphold Special
Trial Judges' findings of fact and
credibility judgments unless they
are clearly erroneous?
FACTS
Burton W. Kanter was a well-known
tax lawyer, as well as an adjunct
professor of law and a businessman.
Claude Ballard and Robert Lisle
were real estate executives for
Prudential Life Insurance Co. of
America (Prudential). The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) alleged that
Messrs. Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle
had an arrangement under which
individuals seeking to do business
with Prudential made payments to
corporations controlled by Kanter,
which were then distributed to
Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle or entities
they controlled. Kanter, Ballard, and
Lisle did not report the payments
on their individual returns. The IRS
therefore asserted deficiencies in
their taxes and subsequently alleged
that their actions were fraudulent.
In the United States Tax Court (Tax
Court), the cases were consolidated
and assigned to Special Trial Judge
Couvillion, who conducted a trial
that lasted almost five weeks.
Special Trial Judges (STJs) are judi-
cial officers appointed by the chief
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FROm: THE ELEVENTH AND THE
SEVENTH CIRCUITS
judge of the Tax Court. Under 26
U.S.C. § 7443A, the STJ did not
have the authority "to make the
decision of the court" in the consol-
idated cases because the tax defi-
ciencies in dispute exceeded
$50,000. Therefore, as required by
Tax Court Rule 183, after trial, the
STJ submitted a report to the chief
judge of the Tax Court. The chief
judge reassigned the matter to Judge
Dawson. In 1999, Judge Dawson
issued an opinion finding the tax-
payers liable for millions of dollars
in tax deficiencies and penalties,
including fraud penalties. See
Investment Research Assocs. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-
407. As is typical in cases decided
under Tax Court Rule 183, the Tax
Court's opinion states that "[the
Court agrees with and adopts the
opinion of the Special Trial Judge,
which is set forth below."
In April and May 2000, the taxpayers
filed motions seeking "all reports,
draft opinions, or similar docu-
ments" prepared by the STJ in their
cases or, in the alternative, to have
the Tax Court include the original
STJ report in the record sent to the
Courts of Appeals. The second
motion sought to have the report
placed under seal for the Courts of
Appeals' review. The Tax Court
denied the motions. In August 2000,
the taxpayers made a motion for
reconsideration that was accompa-
nied by an affidavit. The affidavit,
signed by one of the attorneys for
the Kanters, Randall Dick, stated
that two Tax Court judges had
informed him that the STJ's original
report had found that the taxpayers
were not taxable on payments made
by certain individuals seeking to do
business with Prudential and that the
fraud penalty did not apply. On
August 30, 2000, the Tax Court
denied the motion for reconsidera-
tion, stating, in part, "Judge Dawson
states and Special Trial Judge
Couvillion agrees, that, after a metic-
ulous and time-consuming review of
the complex record in these cases,
Judge Dawson adopted the findings
of fact and opinion of Special Trial
Judge Couvillion. ... " Tax Court
Order Denying Request for Access to
STJ Report, 2001 TNT 23-30. Each
of the three taxpayers filed petitions
for writs of mandamus in their
respective circuits, which were
denied. The taxpayers subsequently
appealed to those circuits.
In Ballard v. Commissioner, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision. With respect to the
issue of the STJ report, the court
stated "the record as presented to us
clearly reveals that the report adopt-
ed by the Tax Court is Special Trial
Judge Couvillion's report. This criti-
cal fact is exhibited in the August
30, 2000 Order signed by Special
Trial Judge Couvillion, Judge
Dawson and the Chief Judge of the
Tax Court." Ballard, 321 F.3d 1037,
1042 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh
Circuit also held that "[e]ven assum-
ing Dick's affidavit to be true and
affording Petitioners-Appellants all
reasonable inferences, the process
utilized in this case does not give
rise to due process concern." The
taxpayers in Ballard petitioned for
certiorari on issues relating to dis-
closure of the STJ's report.
In Estate of Kanter v.
Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court on all but
one of the eight issues it considered,
a tax deduction issue. With respect
to the STJ's report, the court stated
that "[t]he Tax Court's final opinion
clearly states that it 'agrees with
and adopts the opinion of the
Special Trial Judge.' ... The Chief
Judge of the Tax Court, Judge
Dawson, and Special Trial Judge
Couvillion himself all signed the
[Tax Court's] final opinion, and we
take their statement at face value.
Therefore, notwithstanding Kanter's
attorney's declaration, we accept as
true the Tax Court's statement that
the underlying report adopted by
the Tax Court was in fact Special
Trial Judge Couvillion's." Estate of
Kanter, 337 F.3d 833, 840-41 (7th
Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit also
found that a "purportedly quasi-col-
laborative [judicial deliberation]
process would not offend our
notions of fundamental fairness, nor
would due process require the inclu-
sion of the report in the appellate
record to preserve the fairness of
our review." Judge Cudahy dissent-
ed on the issue of the STJ's report,
arguing that the report must be
included in the record on appeal for
the Court of Appeals to review. As
in Ballard, the taxpayers in Estate
of Kanter petitioned for certiorari
on issues relating to disclosure of
the STJ's report.
In Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner,
which is not before the Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court on the fraud issue, which
resulted in one of the tax years
being barred by the statute of limi-
tations and eliminated liability for
any fraud penalty. On the issue of
the STJ's report, the court stated,
"[w]e find the reasoning of the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
direct and persuasive, and adopt it
here. We hold that the application
of Rule 183 in this case did not vio-
late Appellants' due process rights."
Estate of Lisle, 341 F.3d 364, 384
(5th Cir. 2003). Neither party peti-
tioned for certiorari in Estate of
Lisle.
CASE ANALYSIS
The Internal Revenue Code provides
the Tax Court with the authority to
promulgate its own rules of practice
and procedure. Tax Court Rule
183(b), which applied to the consoli-
dated Tax Court proceeding, pro-
vides that the STJ "submit[s] a
report, including findings of fact and
opinion, to the Chief Judge" and the
Issue No. 3132
chief judge assigns the case to a
reviewing judge. The reviewing judge
"may adopt the Special Trial Judge's
report or may modify it or may
reject it in whole or in part, or may
direct the filing of additional briefs
or may receive further evidence or
may direct oral argument, or may
recommit the report with instruc-
tions. Due regard shall be given to
the circumstance that the Special
Trial Judge had the opportunity to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
and the findings of fact recommend-
ed by the Special Trial Judge shall
be presumed to be correct." Tax Ct.
R. 183(c).
This rule does not provide for dis-
closure of the report, unlike a prior
version of the rule. Until 1983, the
last line of former Tax Court Rule
182(b) provided, "[a] copy of the
report shall forthwith be served on
each party." In addition, former Tax
Court Rule 182(c) provided, in part,
"[wjithin 45 days after service of
the Special Trial Judge's report, a
party may file with the Court a brief
setting forth any exceptions of law
or fact to that report."
In their briefs, the taxpayers argue
that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, the right to meaning-
ful review by an Article III court,
and/or federal statutes require dis-
closure of the STJ's report. The tax-
payers make due process arguments
both with respect to the Tax Court
proceeding and with respect to
appellate review of the Tax Court's
decision. In addition, the taxpayers
argue that Tax Court Rule 183
requires deference to the STJ's
report.
In its brief, the government both
responds to these arguments, as dis-
cussed below, and counters with an
argument of its own. The govern-
ment first contends that the taxpay-
ers' principal arguments for disclo-
sure of the STJ's report "are not
properly presented in these cases"
because, it argues, STJ Couvillion's
"final report" was adopted by the
Tax Court and therefore was dis-
closed in the Tax Court's opinion.
The government further argues that
any "original" report submitted by
STJ Couvillion is part of his confi-
dential deliberative processes and
litigants cannot compel disclosure of
these processes. The government
maintains that suggestions that the
reviewing judge improperly influ-
enced the STJ or that the reviewing
judge and STJ collaborated are not
sufficient to warrant disclosure of
the STJ's report. It also argues that
judges are presumed to have dis-
charged their responsibilities.
With respect to due process in the
Tax Court proceeding, the taxpayers
contend that they are entitled to see
the STJ's report because they are
entitled to know the basis of the
court's decision. In addition, the
taxpayers emphasize that the STJ
was the one who presided over the
trial and had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses. They cite
cases such as United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), in
which the Supreme Court expressed
concern about the prospect of a
judge who did not observe the wit-
nesses rejecting the credibility
determinations made by a magis-
trate judge who did.
The government counters that the
Constitution does not compel dis-
closure of the STJ's credibility
assessments. It argues that Raddatz
is not applicable because that case
involved a criminal proceeding. In
addition, the government argues
that, in Raddatz, the Court found
that the Constitution did not pre-
clude de novo review of credibility
determinations so long as the court
could rehear evidence if it so chose,
and Tax Court Rule 183 permits the
reviewing judge to "receive further
evidence" or direct the parties to
file additional briefs.
The taxpayers also contend that all
other areas of modern federal law
provide for routine disclosure of ini-
tial factual findings, so that the Tax
Court's process is at odds with
established norms and presumptive-
ly violates the Due Process Clause.
The government responds that the
full range of procedural protections
applicable in proceedings governed
by Article III of the Constitution is
not required for tax cases. It also
argues that the Tax Court's nondis-
closure practice in the Rule 183
context is not unique, pointing both
to 26 U.S.C. § 7460(b), which pro-
vides that the report of a judge in a
case in which the chief judge directs
its review by the full Tax Court
"shall not be a part of the record,"
and to a non-tax example involving
boards of contract appeals estab-
lished by administrative agencies.
The taxpayers also argue that disclo-
sure of the STJ's report is supported
by the balancing test of Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In
identifying what due process
requires, Mathews considered (1)
the nature of the private interest
involved; (2) the likely reduction in
the risk of an erroneous deprivation
that the procedural safeguards
sought would provide; and (3) the
government's interest, including the
burdens that the procedural safe-
guards sought would impose. In
Ballard and Estate of Kanter, the
taxpayers assert the importance of
the interests of taxpayers in tax
fraud cases, the necessity of disclo-
sure of the report for accurate deci-
sion making, and the lack of burden
in disclosing a report that is already
required to be prepared. The taxpay-
ers maintain that, in fact, disclosure
of the STJ's report would provide a
benefit by increasing the account-
ability of the Tax Court.
The government responds that
because the taxpayers received
(Continued on Page 134)
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extensive process in the Tax Court,
the taxpayers' interest in disclosure
of the STJ's original report is
insignificant. By contrast, the gov-
ernment argues, its interest in
maintaining the current procedure
is substantial because of its interest
in considered and confidential deci-
sion making, the additional time
that would be required for review
were the STJ's report disclosed, and
the government's interest in tax col-
lection more generally.
With respect to due process on
appeal, the taxpayers argue that, in
order to conduct proper review, a
court of appeals must have a com-
plete record that includes the origi-
nal findings of fact. The taxpayers in
Estate of Kanter emphasize the
"clearly erroneous" standard of
review that courts of appeals must
apply to Tax Court decisions, which
they contend requires access to the
initial factual findings. The taxpay-
ers in both cases argue that this
access is particularly important
when the factfinder makes credibili-
ty judgments.
The taxpayers in Ballard also con-
tend that they have a right to mean-
ingful review by an Article III court.
They argue both that once Congress
has granted the right to seek review
of a decision in an Article III court,
the Tax Court cannot effectively
eliminate that right, and that
Supreme Court precedent allows
decision making by Article I courts
only when the parties in those cases
have a right to appeal to an Article
III court. The government counters
that disclosure of the original report
of an STJ is not required for effective
appellate review. The government
argues that, by statute, in tax cases
of this type, only a Tax Court judge,
not an STJ, can make the decision of
the court, and only that decision is
subject to appellate review.
The taxpayers in both Ballard and
Estate of Kanter also argue that the
appellate review statute, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7482(a)(1), requires disclosure of
the STJ's report in order for an
appellate court to review a Tax
Court's decision "in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as deci-
sions of the district courts in civil
actions tried without a jury," as the
statute provides. They argue that
the reports and recommendations of
magistrate judges, special masters,
and bankruptcy judges are all
included in the record on appeal
and are necessary for meaningful
review of district court decisions, so
that failure to provide the STJ's
report to a reviewing court violates
the statutory requirement.
The government contends that the
Internal Revenue Code does not
require disclosure of the STJ's
report. It argues that "Congress did
not intend the 'in the same manner'
language of Section 7482(a)(1) to
import the standards or procedural
rules applicable to proceedings
before a magistrate judge. ..." but
merely responded to the Supreme
Court's decision in Dobson v.
Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943),
which had curtailed appellate
review of Tax Court decisions.
The taxpayers in Estate of Kanter
also argue that 26 U.S.C. § 7461(a),
which provides that "all reports of
the Tax Court and all evidence
received by the Tax Court ... shall
be public records open to the
inspection of the public" and 26
U.S.C. § 7459(b), which requires
the Tax Court to "report in writing
all its findings of fact, opinions, and
memorandum opinions," mandate
disclosure of STJ reports. The tax-
payers contend that § 7461 does not
limit the type of report subject to its
disclosure requirement. They fur-
ther argue that if STJ reports are
not "reports" within the meaning of
the statute, the reports are "evi-
dence" within the meaning of
§ 7461(a) because the reports are
considered by the Tax Court in
making its decisions. The taxpayers
contend that the disclosure statutes
should be construed against the
background of the common-law
right of access to judicial documents
and the concern about secrecy in
tax proceedings that Congress mani-
fested when it enacted these disclo-
sure provisions.
The government counters that these
statutes apply only to "reports
adopted by the Tax Court" and that
reading the statutes to cover STJ
reports would "lead to absurd
results," including requiring official
publication of STJ reports "for pub-
lic information and use" under 26
U.S.C. § 7462. The government fur-
ther argues that STJ reports do not
constitute "evidence" under the dis-
closure provisions; the STJ is not a
party to the proceeding but rather
"operates within the adjudicative
body itself...." The government also
contends that no "'common-law'
right of access extends to STJ
reports" and that that question is
not properly before the court.
The taxpayers also make an argu-
ment that Tax Court Rule 183 itself
requires deference to the STJ's
report. In Stone v. Commissioner,
865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989), an
appeal from a 1983 Tax Court deci-
sion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit interpreted former
Rule 182(d) as imposing a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review.
Former Tax Court Rule 182(d) pro-
vided, in part, that "[d]ue regard
shall be given to the circumstance
that the Special Trial Judge had the
opportunity to evaluate the credibil-
ity of witnesses; and the findings of
fact recommended by the Special
Trial Judge shall be presumed to be
correct." The same language
appears in current Tax Court Rule
183(c). Accordingly, the taxpayers
argue that the reviewing judge must




report and, under Stone, may reject
the STJ's findings of fact only if they
are clearly erroneous.
The government responds that
because "STJ Couvillion's final
report was adopted in full by the
Tax Court, disclosed to the parties,
and included in the record of this
case," the "case does not present
any question concerning the proper
degree of deference to be given an
STJ's recommendations .... " The
government also counters that the
Tax Court's elimination of the prior
provisions for service of the STJ's
report on the parties and the oppor-
tunity to file exceptions made clear
that the Tax Court "does not con-
template any sort of appellate-style
review of STJ reports." Thus, the
government argues that the Stone
decision, which found that a "clear-
ly erroneous" standard applied to
the Tax Court's review of the STJ's
report, is inapposite.
In Estate of Kanter, the taxpayers
also argue that the case warrants
exercise of the Supreme Court's
supervisory power over lower feder-
al courts because the process
involved "departed from the accept-
ed and usual course of judicial pro-
ceedings" as provided in Supreme
Court Rule 10(a). The government
responds that the Supreme Court
has never used that power to alter
the rules of an Article I court that
has the power to prescribe its own
rules and that it would not be
appropriate for the Court to do so
here. The government also contends
that this issue is not included in the
questions before the Court.
SIGNIFICANCE
These cases present important
issues about transparency in adjudi-
cation, particularly with respect to
factfinding by judicial adjuncts. The
Supreme Court will have the oppor-
tunity to decide to what extent ini-
tial findings of fact must be trans-
parent to reviewing courts and liti-
gating parties. If the Court decides
the case on constitutional grounds,
its reasoning will likely extend
beyond the Tax Court to other judi-
cial processes, as well as to quasi-
judicial administrative processes.
These cases may also have broad
significance for the Tax Court as an
institution. The Tax Court is neither
an Article III court nor an adminis-
trative agency, but rather is a court
created by Congress under Article I
of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to
decide the extent to which statutes
or the Constitution require Tax
Court procedures and review of Tax
Court decisions to parallel those of
Article III courts. The Court's opin-
ion also could address the nature
and extent of the Tax Court's rule-
making power, as well as the role of
the Tax Court in the federal system
more generally. Depending on the
scope of the Court's rationale for its
decision, the decision might impact
other Article I courts, as well.
At a more basic level, these cases
are significant for the Tax Court and
its litigants because of the likely
impact of the decision on the Tax
Court's use of STJs. The chief judge
of the Tax Court has discretion to
assign large cases to STJs. In the
past, the Tax Court has used STJs in
cases governed by Rule 183 with
some frequency. For example, in his
separate opinion in the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Estate of
Kanter, Judge Cudahy stated that he
had found more than 880 opinions
in such cases since 1983. A holding
for the taxpayers in the current cas-
es would inevitably occasion
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